Demographischer Sturzflug by Birg, Herwig
1 
 
Who profits from whom? Original source: Weltwoche No. 38, 2015, pages 60-61; translated by English Unit of the DG for 
Translation in the European Parliament (Parlamentarischer Übersetzungsdienst des Europaparlaments)  
 
A demographic tailspin 
 
Germany's asylum enthusiasts and friends of mass immigration claim that large numbers of 
migrants would revive the welfare state and mitigate over-ageing. Wrong. There is no gain to 
be had from poorly educated foreigners, only a loss of prosperity. By Herwig Birg  
 
The use of the term 'demographic 
policy' is coming under close scrutiny 
in Germany, and rightly so. It is all the 
more surprising when, as is lately the 
case, approval is expressed for 
‘demographic policy’ by means of 
immigration. The same people oppose 
promoting a higher birth rate, arguing 
paradoxically that this is a matter of 
‘demographic policy’. 
The Chambers of Industry and 
Commerce are calling for education to 
be provided to refugees and asylum 
seekers, so that they can integrate into 
the labour market rather than being 
forced by law to do nothing. One can 
hardly argue with that. It is equally 
obvious that refugees in need of help 
cannot be abandoned to their fate. It is 
another question, however, whether in 
the long run Germany can maintain the 
demographic basis of its prosperity by 
systematically compensating for a 
shortage of homegrown youth with the 
immigration of young people from 
abroad, while firmly opposing the 
promotion of a higher birth rate in the 
name of ‘demographic policy’. 
In his opening speech to the 2005 
annual conference of the Presidential 
Forum on Demographic Change, the 
former German President Horst Köhler 
wondered out loud whether ‘… the 
much-maligned demographic problems 
[were] not problems at all, but rather 
solutions to other problems.’ By way of 
example, he suggested that a shrinking 
population in Germany was one way to 
compensate for the rapid growth in the 
population of the world. 
 
Incompetence of political leaders 
One may assume that the President had 
been made aware that Germany only 
accounted for about one per cent of the 
world’s population and that this figure 
was declining further. Given this tiny 
fraction, not even the total 
disappearance of the German 
population would stop the global 
population from growing, as it was 
growing by the population of Germany 
each year. So why did the President, 
who took advice at the conference from 
the Bertelsmann Foundation, make this 
inappropriate suggestion nevertheless? 
A vanishing German populace would 
only interrupt the annual rise in the 
world’s population for a few months, 
after which it would continue unabated. 
It is likely that no other president and 
no other foundation in the world would 
seriously contemplate a decline in their 
own country’s population as a means to 
combat global population growth. 
Another example of the 
incompetence of our political leaders is 
the fact that many local governments 
view refugees and asylum seekers as 
their last hope of rescue from their own 
long-term wasting-away. The idea is 
simply intolerable that the existence of 
a town should depend on people in 
need streaming into Germany from a 
sufficient number of crisis zones 
elsewhere. In any case, immigrants to 
Germany themselves have too low a 
birth rate, so the immigrant population 
itself would shrink without a constant 
flow of further immigration. 
 
Immigration does not prevent ageing 
As individuals, people live on through 
their children. The question is whether 
this is also true of populations, or 
whether the survival of a society can 
also be assured through immigration 
rather than homegrown youth. One 
thing is clear:  older people are 
becoming more numerous, while the 
numbers of the young are going down. 
Notwithstanding the fact that the 
numbers of older people will decline 
after around 2045, meaning that the 
retirement homes being founded today 
will have to be closed again, the fall in 
births will continue undiminished, as 
the parents who might have halted the 
downward trend by raising the birth 
rate have not been born. At present, the 
decline is being temporarily interrupted 
as the grandchildren of the large birth 
cohorts of the 1960s are born, but the 
shrinkage of the birth rate will resume 
after 2020 at a faster rate. 
Immigration cannot halt the ageing 
of our society, because ageing is 
primarily due to the declining numbers 
of young people and only to a small 
extent to rising life expectancy.  Ten 
years ago, the United Nations 
Population Division calculated that a 
net total of three-and-a-half million 
younger people would have to migrate 
to Germany each year (and likewise for 
other countries) in order to bring 
ageing to a halt. 
 
Fundamental constitutional principle 
breached 
Politicians who present the 
demographic problem as an 
‘opportunity’ or ‘solution’ for other 
problems and come out in favour of 
immigration instead of promoting 
families with children are not only 
leading the country up a blind alley 
with their eyes wide open, they are also 
ensuring that the demographic problem 
remains unsolved, as by speaking up 
for immigration they distract attention 
from its main cause: our statutory 
pension, health and care insurance 
system rewards childlessness and 
punishes families with children.  It 
thereby breaches the highest 
constitutional principle of every 
democracy – equality of all before the 
law – as the rulings of the Federal 
Constitutional Court, ignored by the 
political world, have made clear. 
Our statutory pension, health 
and care insurance system 
rewards childlessness. 
Immigration does allow some 
consequences of the demographic 
problem, such as labour shortages in 
certain occupations, to be combated, 
but this does not change the 
unconstitutionality of the social 
security system one bit. On the 
contrary, immigration causes further 
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injustices in the migrants' countries of 
origin, as parents go empty-handed if 
their children pay social contributions 
and taxes in Germany that they 
urgently need for their own pensions 
and care. Compensatory migration thus 
undermines the political cohesion of 
the countries of the European Union. 
All people have equal rights and 
duties. The following reflection shows 
that privileges for the childless violate 
this fundamental constitutional 
principle. If half the members of a 
society have children and the other half 
do not, one half of the population will 
have to be supported by the children of 
the other half in retirement, in ill health 
and when they need care, even if, 
unlike here in Germany, the birth rate 
is so high that on average every woman 
has two children, such that the 
population thus neither shrinks nor ages 
and no immigration is required. 
In contrast to the example given 
above, it is not the case in Germany 
that half the population remains 
childless, but the national average is 
already about a quarter and the average 
for the largest group – non-immigrant 
women in the former West German 
federal states – is about a third. The 
number of childless people is rising 
with every annual cohort, so the 
example of 50% childlessness is by no 
means far-fetched. In Germany, unlike 
in the example, this is exacerbated by 
the fact that the birth rate of 1.4 live 
births per woman is well below the 
two-child level, with the result that the 
indigenous section of the population is 
shrinking while the section made up of 
immigrants and their descendants is 
getting larger, thanks to the constant 
flow of new immigrants and an excess 
of births over deaths. At present, 16.4 
million people in Germany have an 
immigrant background. 
If one weighs up the costs and 
benefits of immigration, for instance by 
examining its effect on public finances, 
the result may be positive or negative, 
depending on what items are looked at. 
The balance of payments by 
immigrants into and out of the pension 
and care insurance system is generally 
positive, on account of their younger 
age structure, especially when the 
figures are drawn up on a one-year 
basis. The opposite result may arise, 
however, if later years in which 
pensions are paid are also taken into 
account. Although the age structure of 
immigrants is substantially lower now, 
the proportion of elderly immigrants 
(the ratio of people over 65 to those 
aged between 15 and 64) is increasing 
faster than for non-immigrants. The 
beneficial effect of the younger age 
structure will decline over time as the 
age structures converge. 
 
Fairness between generations 
Every cost-benefit calculation I know 
of leaves the most important question 
out. From a purely economic 
standpoint, is it better for an ageing 
society to close the birth gap by raising 
the birth rate to an average of two 
children per woman, as in the 1960s 
(Strategy A)? Or is it better from the 
economic standpoint to offset the 
shortfall of births through immigration 
(Strategy B)? 
Strategy A is supported by the 
following mathematically provable 
reflection: If every generation pursues 
the same goal, namely to keep the ratio 
of the pensions and benefits they 
provide to their parents' generation and 
their children's generation in middle 
age to the benefits they receive from 
their children's generation in retirement 
as favourable as possible, i.e. to 
minimise it, this goal is best attained if 
the per-capita contributions of the 
parents' generation are equal to the per-
capita contributions of the children's 
generation (=fairness between 
generations). In such a situation, each 
successive generation would be the 
same size, so that the population 
(excluding migration) remains 
constant. This means that the goal of 
fairness between generations will only 
be achieved if the goal of demographic 
stability is achieved too. 
This mathematically provable result 
is encouraging, as it plainly supports 
the renewal of the population through 
births (Strategy A). At the same time, 
there is another argument to be made 
against the German practice of 
generational replenishment through 
immigration (Strategy B). If we assume 
that Germany aims to achieve a high 
per-capita gross national product, on 
the grounds that this guarantees a high 
level of consumption and thus also 
ensures that the necessary public funds 
are available to provide a good 
infrastructure. In such a case, it is 
always better to have a higher per-
capita GNP than a higher absolute 
GNP. Otherwise, people would 
emigrate from Switzerland to India and 
not vice versa. In other words: the more 
migrants come to Germany, the higher 
the absolute GNP will generally be, but 
the level and growth rate of per-capita 
income will be smaller. 
 
Nonsensical ban on interpretation 
This result is supported both by my 
own calculations and by a new study by 
Holger Bonin at the Zentrum für 
Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung 
GmbH (Centre for European Economic 
Research Ltd) in Mannheim, which 
was funded by the Bertelsmann 
Foundation and attracted considerable 
attention. The results of the study were 
as follows: 
 
1. – On average, the per-capita 
'financial contribution' of Germans, that 
is, the net amount of individually 
attributable payments to and receipts 
from the state, is higher than that for 
foreigners,  at €4,000 as opposed to 
€3,300 (Bonin, p. 27).  
2. – "If one adopts the forward-looking 
perspective of generational accounting, 
[...] the generational balance by annual 
cohort is positive for substantially 
fewer cohorts in the foreign population 
than in the German population. Under 
status-quo conditions, foreigners born 
in 2012 will receive on average around 
€44,100 more in transfers over the total 
life cycle than they will pay in tax and 
social security contributions. By 
contrast, Germans born in 2012 will 
make a clearly positive contribution to 
public finances. Over the course of 
their lives, they will pay on average 
€110,800 more in taxes and social 
security contributions than they will 
receive in individually attributable 
transfers (Bonin, p. 30).  
3. – If the generational accounts are 
weighted according to the population 
structure in the initial year, then the 
per-capita financial contribution of the 
German population is €88,500, while 
that for the foreign population is 
€22,300 (Bonin, p. 32). 
4. – A further calculation takes in 
average per-capita state spending on 
infrastructure and administrative 
services in addition to individually 
attributable payment flows. This too 
produces a gap in favour of the 
Germans: "Over the course of its 
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lifetime, every newborn child will 
generate a quite substantial deficit: the 
cohort deficit for children of foreigners 
is €196,000, while the deficit for 
Germans is less, namely €41,100. 
Following this principle, the same 
figures will also result for all future 
generations, in so far as their fiscal 
behaviour is the same as their parents' 
and the state does not in future cut back 
on general public expenditure." (Bonin, 
p. 36). 
 
Surprisingly, the author of the 
Bertelsmann study imposes the 
following nonsensical ban on 
interpreting the results of his own 
research: "Above all, one must not 
infer from this that foreigners would 
represent a fiscal burden on Germans if 
a comprehensive assessment was made 
that took account of the lack of 
sustainability of current German fiscal 
policy." (Bonin, p. 38). The media 
dutifully followed this ban on 
interpretation, and so the refrain that 
"Germany profits from immigration" is 
now constantly heard. Yet proponents 
of this view are disproved by the very 
Bertelsmann study on which it is based. 
the contributions, incomes 
and tax payments of non-
immigrants are higher. 
So who profits from whom – non-
immigrants from immigrants, or vice 
versa? The Bertelsmann study 
calculations described above, like many 
other previous investigations, all show 
a clear gap: The contributions, incomes 
and tax payments of non-immigrants 
are higher than those of immigrants. 
The gap in transfers is in the same 
direction; otherwise it would be 
impossible to explain why the 
percentage of social aid recipients is 
around three times higher for 
immigrants than for non-immigrants. If 
a good student and a middling one did 
their homework together, no one would 
say that the better student profited from 
the mediocre one. No one except the 
Bertelsmann Foundation. 
 
'The demographic opportunity' 
Generally speaking, the result of any 
comparison depends on the basis of 
comparison selected, as two simple 
examples will show by way of 
conclusion. Example 1: Is Germany's 
economy better off with or without 
immigration? Answer 1: Without 
immigration, we would probably have 
an economic reverse, due to a shortage 
of labour and lower demand, so we are 
better off with immigration than 
without it. 
Example 2: Will Germany's 
economy be better off with 
immigration or with its own offspring 
instead of immigration? Answer 2: 
With our own offspring instead of 
immigration, we would have a better-
qualified population (German students 
do relatively well by comparison in the 
international Pisa tests, whereas the 
children of migrants do badly) and 
productivity, per-capita income and 
growth would be higher than they 
would be with inward migration. 
In my new book, I show that 
Germany's demographic dive is in the 
midst of turning into a tailspin (The 
Ageing Republic and the Failure of 
Politics: a Demographic Forecast 
(LITVerlag, Berlin 2015). If we still 
want to stop it, a fundamental rethink is 
required. Instead, the former Federal 
Minister for Education and Research, 
Annette Schwan, made "The 
demographic opportunity" the slogan 
for the 2013 Science Year. If one 
follows this reasoning, the carpet-
bombing of German cities in the 
Second World War was not so much a 
disaster as an "opportunity" for 
reconstruction. 
A nation's prosperity results from an 
intergenerational chain of culturally 
based contributions that begins anew 
with each individual. It starts in 
families with the raising of children 
with the capacity to learn, continues 
with a striving for education and 
knowledge at schools and universities 
and finally appears in the economy in 
the form of competitive products. The 
links in the chain are weakened if the 
shrinking numbers of homegrown 
young people are offset by the 
immigration of people with a below-
average level of education and training. 
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